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Introduction
David Kennedy and Joseph E. Stiglitz
As the link between law and economic development has been increasingly recog-
nized, it has become commonplace to assert that development is not possible
without a “rule of law” and good property rights. Today, these ideas are promoted
in the academy, in the development policy community, and by leading inter-
national financial institutions, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organ-
izations. There is even a special unit within the UNDP devoted to the promotion
of these ideas.1 Law is certainly crucial for economic development. But what kind
of “rule of law” is desirable? What constitutes “good” property rights?
These questions are of particular importance to China as it continues the march
toward a market economy “with Chinese characteristics” that it began in 1979, a
little more than thirty years ago. China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan recognized that
one of the key challenges going forward is to create the institutional infrastructure
to facilitate the development of such a market, including an appropriate legal
framework of institutions, rules, and regulations. The papers collected here
illuminate today’s debates about just what legal arrangements are, in fact, appro-
priate for a market “with Chinese characteristics.”
We focus on two broad questions. How might one define and regulate property
and other legal rights in a market economy “with Chinese characteristics?” And
how should we understand China’s experience with significant questions of
constitutional design, particularly with respect to centralization and decentral-
ization, and the role of the judiciary? We hope to make visible the range of
experimentation and the diversity of experience with legal and institutional design
in China, while also offering a range of perspectives on the relevance of Western
experience and Western ideas about the links between legal arrangements and
economic performance.
We stress throughout the significance—and breadth—of the choices available
for China as it establishes the ground rules and institutional structures for an
expanding market economy. A key set of issues, discussed below, concerns
property rights. A major strand of work in law and development has argued
that establishing well-defined property rights is the central problem in develop-
ment. We challenge that presumption. Indeed, we should probably place terms
such as “property rights” in quotations, for it is not at all clear what such terms
should mean. That is one of the questions under discussion here. Some of the
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papers in this volume even question the widespread assumption that a better legal
system involves a more precise definition of property rights.
These choices are often discussed in the shadow of quite specific ideas about
what has and has not worked in the West. While most policymakers know that
China could not and should not simply “borrow” legal and institutional frame-
works from the United States or some other advanced industrial country, there is
no shortage of proposals to import this or that supposedly “best practice” legal
arrangement from the West. On the whole, we are skeptical about this kind of
importation. This book, in contrast, focuses on what China might indeed learn
from the history of the quite different choices that various Western nations have
made, and the various ways their choices have played out.
Contemporary discussions of economic development policy, as well as of the
legal and institutional arrangements most conducive to sound policy, continue to
be influenced by the neoliberal intellectual framework that dominated thinking
among economists and jurists in the later years of the last century, especially those
informed by the Chicago School tradition.2 In our view, this orthodoxy, which
remains prominent in much of both the legal and the economic academy, is a poor
guide to the legal and institutional choices facing China today. This book draws on
other traditions within economic and legal thought to highlight the range of
choices available to China as it lays the foundations for its own market economy.
The orthodoxy is correct, however, in its insistence that background entitle-
ments are absolutely central to the operation of markets. Legal arrangements
matter. How entitlements are allocated and defined can make all the difference
over time. They could determine, for instance, whether there emerges a large class
of landless peasants, or a small elite group dominating the economy. As a result, it
is absolutely critical to focus on the allocation of property and other background
entitlements as China sets up the framework for its own distinctive market
economy. These background rules—to which we should add corporate law,
bankruptcy law, and rules about finance—structure the players who will partici-
pate in markets, and how they will interact, settling their respective powers
and obligations while establishing an initial allocation of resources, income
streams, and risk.
The fact that we dwell so long on issues pertaining to property rights may seem
strange in a book about contemporary Chinese economic policy. Economic policy
seems far more a matter of institutional arrangements and the details of regulation
than of property rights. Private law—contracts, property, the law of obligations—
is generally considered part of the background for economic policy-making. We
are convinced, however, that at this juncture, a rigorous assessment of the nature
of property rights is warranted.
We do not intend to provide detailed prescriptions for reforming the legal and
institutional structures in any country. Rather, we hope to contribute to debates
within academia and within policymaking circles by expanding and informing the
intellectual frameworks through which choices among legal and institutional
possibilities are made, both in the developing world and in the advanced industrial
societies. The fact that China is in the midst of designing its legal and regulatory
framework—making decisions that will affect the shape of its economy for
decades to come—gives, of course, particular salience to this debate. China
provides a concrete setting within which these issues can be discussed.
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This book is the result of a series of dialogues among academics and policy-
makers from China and around the world, held at the Brooks World Poverty
Institute at the University of Manchester, at Columbia University (under the
auspices of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue and the Committee on Global
Thought), and in Beijing (at Peking University, with the joint sponsorship of
the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, the Committee on Global Thought, Columbia
Global Centers Beijing, Peking University, Tsinghua University, China Develop-
ment Research Foundation, The Institute for Global Law and Policy at Harvard
Law School, and Brooks World Poverty Institute).3
Our authors straddle ongoing intellectual debates in a variety of ways. Some are
more familiar with the Chinese economic experience and reflect here on the
institutional and legal elements that have been—and ought to be—enshrined
within it by focusing on specific policy areas and challenges, from decentralization
to health care and urban policy. Individual papers within this volume examine the
details of specific development policies and institutional characteristics of the
emerging Chinese market economy, assessing the record of the last years and
highlighting elements that have—and have not—been successful. Other authors
are more familiar with Western debates about the relationship between legal
forms and economic performance. They reflect here on the lessons for and from
the Chinese experience for our understanding of the links between economics and
law. Our authors are not at all of one mind about the nature of the Chinese market
economy, nor about the relationship between legal arrangements and economic
performance. The authors do share the conviction that China is now entering a
critical phase in its economic development and its move to a market economy
with Chinese characteristics and that law and institutions are crucial components
in the development equation. Each has something important to contribute to our
understanding of the potential significance of diverse legal forms for the future of
Chinese market capitalism.
TOWARDS A MARKET ECONOMY WITH CHINESE
CHARACTERISTICS
China, as we have noted, is now entering a critical phase in its move to a market
economy. There are, of course, a variety of types of market economies—the
Scandinavian model differs from the Anglo-American, the Japanese, or the
Continental European models. Every market economy has distinctive legal and
institutional arrangements that reflect its own political, social, and cultural his-
tory. History and culture continue to matter, if only because they affect norms
and beliefs, which in turn affect how legal and institutional arrangements work in
practice. China has committed itself to developing a market economy with its own
distinctive characteristics. Those distinctive features are now becoming visible and
have increasingly become subjects of debate, both within and outside China,
particularly where they diverge from what is understood in one or another place
to be “best practice.” Our authors offer a number of perspectives on what has and
has not worked to this point.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 25/10/2012, SPi
Introduction 3
Comp. by: PG2793 Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0001744191 Date:25/10/12 Time:11:55:28
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001744191.3D4
A distinguishing feature of China’s evolution, however, is that the economy
continues to change rapidly, changing the institutional forms through which
economic life proceeds. At one stage, township and development enterprises
(so-called “TVEs”) dominated China’s development strategy. At another, joint
ventures dominated. There is no reason to believe that the structures that have
dominated in the past decade will do so in the next. Indeed, China has committed
itself to deep structural change: for instance, by seeking to become less dependent
on exports and to reduce adverse environmental impacts. Organizational forms
and regulatory incentives will also need to be able to change. A commitment to
economic change and flexibility demands legal and institutional arrangements
that are themselves both robust and flexible.
Legal and institutional regimes are constantly evolving through administrative,
judicial, and regulatory processes. In every society, the people who participate
are affected by political and intellectual currents whether they are elected
or appointed. Moreover, institutional and legal structures create vested interests
and help form coalitions that shape these processes. We have seen how, in
America, they helped shape a process that led to financial market deregulation
and bank bailouts; those same processes are helping to shape the post-crisis
regulatory debate. The relationship between political choices and institutional
forms is itself dynamic and iterative. This will also be true for China.
Nevertheless, starting points matter. Early decisions must be taken with a view
toward their dynamic impact on the operation of an evolving market. Discussions
over the next few years will have a major effect in determining the kind of market
economy into which China will evolve. That evolution will condition—and be
conditioned by—the legal and institutional arrangements that are now being
put in place. Legal arrangements entrench interests, conditioning the dynamic
evolution of market forms. Legal frameworks governing property rights, compe-
tition, corporate governance, intellectual property, bankruptcy, contracts, and
more will influence what it will mean a generation from now to say the market
economy is one with “Chinese characteristics.” As a result, this is a particularly
important moment to assess differences in institutional arrangements and their
consequences. What would normally be an academic exercise could turn out to
have an enormous impact on a quarter of the world’s population. This volume
aims to clarify choices now available to China as it establishes what will become
the long-term framework for its own distinctive market economy.
THE RELEVANCE OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTS FOR CHINA
Early on, China recognized that it needed to have a distinctive form of market
economy, appropriate to its distinctive circumstances and history. Even with
clarity about the kind of economy and society China would like to create going
forward, it is not clear now precisely what kinds of legal and institutional
arrangements are necessary to achieve those goals. China faces debates about
regulation, property rights, and institutional forms that are familiar among
economists in the West. Just how relevant are their answers? It is easy to
imagine that one might learn what China needs to do to achieve success by
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studying the legal and institutional arrangements of development success stor-
ies—perhaps particularly the advanced industrial economies of North America
and Western Europe.
As it turns out, however, these societies have a wide range of distinctive legal
and institutional features. Some of their differences are accidents of history and
others reflect deeply held cultural views and political choices. Whether these
arrangements, transported elsewhere, would be equally successful—or would
even embody the same values and political choices—is far from clear. In
our experience, those living in a given market economy often overestimate the
importance of their own distinctive national arrangements to their own economic
success. They may even come to feel their own institutions are required for the
success of any market economy. Remarkably, people may feel this way even about
institutional arrangements that have resulted from historical accidents or cultural
developments far from economic policy—and where other nations have experi-
enced superior economic performance with alternative arrangements. As a result,
it is wise to exercise care in looking for successful legal arrangements to import.
Accordingly, we bring a deep skepticism about the desirability of extending
popular, if largely mistaken, pieties about the legal prerequisites for strong eco-
nomic performance in a market economy. Indeed, our discussions over the last
three years have left us ever more hesitant to extrapolate from what we think we
know about the relationship between law and economics in the West to what
ought to characterize the institutional and legal framework for further develop-
ment in China.
In good part, our hesitance arises from the realization that much “common
sense” about the relationship between law and economics in the West itself is
incorrect. While it is widely accepted that developing countries need to adopt
“good” legal frameworks, there is no agreement today about what that means. If
this could be said before the global financial crisis, it is even more so today, as even
those in the West are questioning the assumptions underlying the policy frame-
works and legal structures that govern economic affairs.
The crisis has destroyed a large number of prevailing myths and shibboleths. It
has even thrown into doubt our ability to recognize “bad” frameworks. For
instance, independent central banks were supposed to be the “best practice”
institutional arrangement for governing financial markets. As it was, more inde-
pendent central banks, such as those in the US and Europe, performed less well
than did less independent central banks, such as those of India, China, and Brazil.
The independent central banks were evidently more easily captured by the
financial sector that they were supposed to be regulating.
Similarly, before the crisis, most would have thought of America’s financial
regulatory structure as exemplary. The international financial institutions had
urged countries around the world to aspire to that as a “model.” The crisis
exposed the US regulatory system as having been “captured” (intellectually, if
not financially) by those it was supposed to regulate. A system of “revolving
doors” on the part of those who wrote and implemented regulations created
distorted incentives. And the problems weren’t limited to America’s financial
regulatory structure: defects in corporate governance help explain why bank
executives may have done so well, even as shareholders and bondholders lost
so much.
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Intellectual property provides another example, which we discuss below. While
there is widespread support for the notion that there should be some form of
intellectual property protection, details matter. America held up its intellectual
property regime as “best practice” and tried to extend it to the rest of the world.
Within the United States, meanwhile, dissatisfaction with the intellectual property
regime has grown. For example, many in the software industry worry that it stifles
innovation, while many health advocates believe it impairs access to life-saving
medicines. The social, political, and economic choices embedded in the intellec-
tual property regime have been reopened for debate.
This book begins where confidence in the right answers and model practices
fades.
THE UNFORTUNATE IMPORTANCE OF NEOLIBERAL
POLICY ORTHODOXY
Even as China works to create its own distinctive legal and institutional frame-
work, it will inevitably look to “models” abroad. It will strive to incorporate at least
the best ideas, if not the best practices. Moreover, China’s success over the past
three decades is in no small measure a result of globalization. It will, at the very
least, need to harmonize, to some extent, its policy frameworks with those of the
rest of the world. As it seeks to attract investment, it will inevitably be sensitive to
others’ perspectives on its own legal and institutional framework. Much of the
debate within the papers in this volume centers around the economic significance
of particular regulatory arrangements and forms of property often associated with
the Anglo-American economic tradition.4 The question is, to what extent are
these appropriate for China today?
In recent years, as we commented earlier, ideas about the role of law in
development have been greatly influenced by attitudes about law held by Chicago
School economists responsible for the neoliberal consensus about what constitutes
good national economic policy. One result has been the emergence among
economists of a powerful orthodoxy about “best practice” legal and institutional
arrangements for market efficiency and growth. At the same time, many econo-
mists and legal scholars in the United States—and in the international financial
institutions—have developed theories and launched empirical studies suggesting
the superiority of specific legal and institutional arrangements they regard as
characteristic of the Anglo-American model of market economy and which they
see as expressing the unvarying demands of market efficiency. One result of this
intellectual work has been the emergence, starting in the mid-1980s, of a powerful
orthodoxy about the “best practice” legal and institutional arrangements for
market efficiency and growth. This legal orthodoxy has run parallel to—and
often been linked with—neoliberal economic policy orthodoxy. Like their neo-
liberal economic cousins, neoliberal proponents of “best practice” legal arrange-
ments have been active in global debates about the institutional framework for
national development. They have also been active in discussions about Chinese
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economic policy, promoting these “best practice” legal and institutional forms as
integral to China’s transition to a market economy.
In broad terms, the neoliberal orthodoxy, both legal and economic, has been
hostile to economic regulation and supportive only of those specific rules thought
necessary to “support” markets. The list of legal rules necessary to support a
market can seem quite limited: a clear assignment of property rights, strong and
independent judiciary to enforce those entitlements, the institutional framework
for an independent monetary policy, an effective criminal justice system, particu-
larly with respect to corruption. Other rules are broadly viewed as “distorting” the
work of market forces, however important they may be as expressions of political
or moral commitment. Underlying this set of policy preferences is a strong
presumption that markets are competitive, that the pricing mechanism operates
effectively, that markets can handle externalities and public goods on their own,
and that individuals should bear responsibility for protecting themselves (caveat
emptor) and that an economic policy oriented to growth ought to distinguish what
is necessary for efficiency from what might be desirable for other reasons. There is
little attention in this framework to the conditions that might transform efficiency
into growth, or to the availability of alternative development paths and alternative
equilibria with different distributional effects.
Interestingly, just as these ideas were gaining currency in development policy
discussions, the Chicago tradition was itself coming under attack both by econo-
mists and legal scholars. In both legal and economic circles, the challenges have
been empirical and historical as well as analytic and theoretical.
The historical/empirical critique
Economists and legal scholars have challenged the association of the policies
associated with neoliberal economic and legal orthodoxy with economic growth
and efficient market organization. They have questioned whether these legal
arrangements can be reliably linked, theoretically or empirically, either to market
efficiency or to growth, let alone both. East Asia’s success—the most rapid growth
in the history of the world—based on other premises provides evidence that the
neoliberal model (both the economic and legal doctrines) is not necessary for
growth. The failure of so many Latin American countries that attempted to follow
neoliberal dictates provides evidence that the model is not sufficient for growth.
And the repeated crises confronting economies that have adopted that model—of
which the current crisis is the most recent and most devastating—shows that
whatever growth is produced may not be sustainable and that the “model” is
subject to high levels of instability, imposing costs that few developing countries
can afford.
Critics of the neoliberal legal movement have gone further, even questioning
whether the paradigmatic “best practice” legal forms actually do characterize the
American economy. The global financial crisis has shown, for instance, real
weaknesses in America’s ability to address the legal issues posed as so many
debtors are unable or unwilling to meet their obligations. The legal and economic
system allowed conflicts of interest to arise between holders of first and second
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mortgages, and between service providers—conflicts that impaired efficient re-
structurings of the mortgages.
But even if America’s “best practice” legal structures worked well for America at
one time, there is no presumption that they will be well designed for another.
Questions have also been raised about whether these legal forms can really be
made universal, rooted as they are in quite specific cultural and political commit-
ments. Notions such as “best practices” and the ability to transplant legal frame-
works from one society—where it might indeed have worked well—to another
have all come to be questioned.
All of this raises questions about whether neoliberal legal orthodoxy is at all
appropriate for China today—or even provides an appropriate point of departure.
To answer that question, it is important to grasp the extent to which the intellec-
tual underpinnings of the neoliberal orthodoxy have also been theoretically and
analytically eroded.
The economic critique
The most straightforward and well-known theoretical critique of the neoliberal
policy orthodoxy came from within economics. The foundation for the policy
prescriptions of the neoliberal tradition was a set of hypotheses about how
markets work. The most important of these is the presumption that they are
(Pareto)-efficient. The economic model was shown to be badly flawed and its
conclusions dependent on highly unrealistic assumptions. Slight changes in those
assumptions, especially in the direction of increased realism, lead to markedly
different results. Even slight frictions could, for instance, lead to highly noncom-
petitive outcomes. Advances in economics (theoretical and empirical), including
the development of game theory and theories of asymmetric information, have
provided alternative frameworks, with strikingly different conclusions and mark-
edly different policy implications.
The broad resistance to regulation associated with neoliberal orthodoxy has
been criticized by economists as the underlying economic presumptions have
been undermined by research over the past three decades. If markets are not in
general efficient (which they are not), then there is a role for the state, in addition
to supporting the market—a market-“correcting” role. Today, almost all societies
understand that markets by themselves lead to unacceptable environmental
degradation. There is a need for environmental regulation—something that
China too has recognized. But, contrary to the neoliberal view, “market failures”
are pervasive.
Moreover, while the neoliberal orthodoxy focuses on efficiency, standard eco-
nomic theory never provided any presumption that market outcomes were
“socially acceptable,” consistent with any principle of social justice or solidarity.
Nor was there any presumption that a Pareto-efficient equilibrium would generate
development or lead to growth. The underlying theoretical separation of efficiency
from other considerations has been undermined by critiques of the neoclassical
model stretching back more than thirty years. It is now clear that in establishing
the institutional structure for a market economy, more than efficiency is of
concern. The neoliberal legal model was not only based on a flawed economic
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model—its tenets did not necessarily lead to overall economic efficiency—but
even more importantly, it left out critical issues of equity and social justice, that we
believe need to be at the heart of a country’s legal system.
Not surprisingly, given the lack of robustness of the model, the policy conclu-
sions—including for the design of legal and institutional frameworks—were also
shown not to be robust. Chicago School reasoning had, for instance, led to
skepticism about whether predatory pricing could occur, with the result that the
US Supreme Court imposed a heavy burden on anyone attempting to bring a
predatory pricing case under the competition laws. Anyone schooled in the new
and more robust theories would have come to quite different conclusions. Not
only did the newer theories show that markets are not in general (Pareto)-
efficient, but they also explained why one cannot separate out issues of equity
and efficiency.5 Choices still need to be made.
The Chicago School ideas about economics have come under particular criti-
cism in the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008, with leading policymakers
(such as Alan Greenspan) and leading thinkers (such as Richard Posner) engaging
in what appears to be at least a partial recantation.6 After all, the neoliberal
orthodoxy had helped shape not only the legal framework, but also the behavior
of regulators and regulatory policy—and even affected the behavior of investors
and banks.
The legal critique
Within the legal academy, the attack was complementary and, in some ways,
deeper. To start, it is critical to understand that the background rules structuring
market arrangements are not natural entitlements—they are social arrangements
designed to promote social objectives. This is most obvious in the case of
newer legal innovations such as “intellectual property” or “limited liability corpor-
ations.” These are social constructions, the merits and designs of which have to be
constantly evaluated and reevaluated. But it is no less true of “property” and
“contract.” In every market economy, each is a complex legal regime reflecting a
history of social, political, and economic conflict and debate.
In practice, the legal and institutional structures provide some of the most
important “social protections” in modern societies. In every market economy, the
particular form of these structures reflects social as well as economic consider-
ations. This is also the case in China. Inattention to the relationship between
economic opportunities and social outcomes can have terrible consequences that
are difficult or impossible to correct through the political process. The regulatory
failures of the financial system in America have resulted in wiping out a significant
fraction of the wealth of America’s poorest families, unlikely to be made up for
by redistributions. The institutional framework has, simultaneously, played an
important role in the creation of large inequalities—again, not typically offset by
political action. Laws allowing financial firms to engage in predatory lending,
combined with new bankruptcy laws, have created a new class of partially inden-
tured servants—people who may have to give as much as 25 percent of what they
earn for the rest of their lives to the banks.
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In many societies, the place of social responsibilities in the legal architecture for
the economy is being rethought. In some nations this has occurred at the consti-
tutional level. South Africa’s Constitution incorporated new social and economic
rights, including rights relating to housing which have been given new meanings
and importance by the judiciary. India’s Supreme Court has expanded rights to
include environmental protection and access to food. American courts have long
supported certain rights to education. Many countries recognize rights to health
care. What is entailed by these social and economic rights—how expansive they
are—has been a major source of debate. These debates are visible when they play
out at the constitutional or legislative level, but they are equally significant in the
elaboration of background norms structuring the market itself. Where, as in
China, those foundational legal arrangements are being established or altered,
the same social considerations come into play.
The legal structure of property and contract, like that of corporate authority
and finance, everywhere reflects a complex series of trade-offs among social
interests. There is no particular set of rules that is Pareto-optimal—best for all
stakeholders—as many economic policymakers influenced by the Chicago School
sometimes seem to suggest. Even if there were such a set of rules, there is no
assurance they would be Pareto-optimal at another time or in another place.
Sometimes rights conflict—unfettered property rights exercised by one individual
may conflict with others’ right to the environment. Legal frameworks specify
how these rights are to be balanced. Establishing a regime of background rules
distributes power and resources among various potential market players. There
are winners and losers. Background rules often institutionalize these initial gains
and losses in ways that compound differences over time. Different institutional
designs can lead to quite different outcomes.
In a deeper sense, neoliberal policy orthodoxy ignores a set of basic truths about
transforming economic ideas into legal institutions and about the nature of legal
reasoning itself. The central distinctions upon which the neoliberal orthodoxy
rests turn out to be extremely difficult to maintain when translated into legal
terms. The boundary between “market-supporting” and “market-distorting” legal
arrangements is notoriously hard to draw. The more you look at it, the harder it is
to distinguish private entitlements enforced by the state from regulations imposed
by legislation or administrative action. Moreover, distributional choices are built
into all these legal rules and institutions that affect both efficiency and equity.
More broadly, legal frameworks are both conceptually and sociologically more
complex, with more room for choice among alternative legal arrangements than
was appreciated by many Chicago School economists who became interested in
law as a development tool.
Indeed, a “law and economics” tradition has long existed in the American legal
academy, which begins with the necessity to attend to precisely these choices and
complexities. Within the legal academy, even those who find the neo-classical
economics of the Chicago School largely compelling recognize that when turned
into a vernacular for policy, the Chicago School has carried with it unwarranted
assumptions about the legal rules that structure a market. Economic actors
bargain in the shadow of background rules that distribute bargaining power
amongst them. Those initial distributions matter to both efficiency as well as
equity, given the transaction costs associated with reallocation.
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In the simplistic economic models underlying the Chicago School approach, as
we have seen, issues of equity and efficiency are neatly separated. The crude
implication for policy is often to assume that distribution can wait—the first
objective ought to be efficiency. For development, of course, distribution often
cannot wait—efficiency may be less a sure recipe for growth than a ticket to
another low-level equilibrium. Focusing on the legal regime, however, brings
distribution back into the story right from the start. The background rules of
property and contract that undergird market transactions reflect distributional
choices that cannot be divided, either sociologically or conceptually, between
those which concern efficiency and equity. After all, prices emerge from bargains
among people with different entitlements—the structure of those entitlements
will affect those bargains.7
This might matter less if entitlements could be costlessly rearranged by the
market. Indeed, one often finds reference to this idea in the neoliberal economic
literature, attributed to Ronald Coase.8 Unfortunately, things are not this simple.
First, as Coase himself recognized, transaction costs are ubiquitous and matter for
the assignment of property rights. A long tradition of legal analysis has focused on
the implications of this recognition for policy—the ways in which the assignment
of property rights might affect the size and impact of transaction costs.9 Second,
the market through which these entitlements might be rearranged must itself also
be legally constituted. The power of actors, whether individuals or firms, must be
established, their authority with respect to various entitlements specified, the
conditions for the enforcement of contracts to rearrange entitlements spelled
out, and so forth. In short, from a legal perspective there must be entitlements
before there is a market for entitlements, allocating bargaining power and
affecting transaction costs in ways that may matter for efficiency as well as equity.
Interestingly, on the “economics” side of neoliberal orthodoxy about develop-
ment policy, these legal qualifications have often gone unnoticed. The importance
of transaction costs has often been ignored or relegated to a footnote, with the
implication that, to a first-order approximation, the assignment of property rights
made no difference. The importance of background norms to bargaining power
and the centrality of distribution to the legal structure of a market have been
downplayed. Ironically, this has occurred at the same time advances in economics
recognized the importance of these frictions, especially those associated with
information costs and asymmetries.10
Among economists, there was often an oversimplification of “property rights,”
a failure to note the responsibilities that might be associated with these rights (an
owner of property may be responsible for making sure his property is not used to
dump toxic wastes); a failure to note the multiple dimensions of property (in
many countries, the owner of a property does not have the rights to the mineral
resources below the ground—these remain properties of the state); or a failure to
note restrictions (e.g. reservations about rights of way) and the variety of possible
“bundles of rights” compatible with a legal regime protecting property . These
qualifications become even more important as property rights get extended from
real estate to intellectual property: should the owner of these property rights have
the right of exclusion, or only the right to collect fair rents from those who
“trespass” on his property?
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The book aims to bring together the strands of criticism and qualification that
have developed among both economists and legal scholars in the wake of the
neoliberal orthodoxy’s ascendance for development policymakers late in the last
century. Our discussions have sought to develop an alliance between increasingly
well-known criticisms of neoliberal economic orthodoxy—from which China has
been an important dissenting voice and alternative model—and less well-known
criticisms of neoliberal legal orthodoxy, which has had a far more successful run of
late in Chinese policy circles. By bringing those two discussions together, we hope
to foster a discussion between alternative economic and legal analytics, set in the
context of Chinese experience. By doing so, we hope to contribute to our under-
standing of fundamental issues about the relationship between economic life and
the rule of law. The task going forward is to develop the concrete implications of
this alternative view for the design of legal and institutional arrangements in the
Chinese context.
OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK
As a general matter, this volume leans against the view that “neoliberal” legal or
economic orthodoxy ought to guide Chinese reform. Our project began before the
Great Recession, and until the global economic crisis, a number of variants of
“market fundamentalism” held sway among some economic and financial
“experts” in China, and there appeared to be a risk that these ideas would become
embedded into the legal and regulatory framework. We enter the examination of
current Chinese development policy and regulatory practice informed by the
history of these debates about the relevance of North American and Western
European models and the legacy of criticism among economists and lawyers about
the usefulness of neoliberal policy prescriptions.
The book is divided into three sections. In the first, we develop the conceptual
foundations for our discussions by reviewing debates about both the nature of
Chinese economic policy in light of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plans, and
the potential for a productive engagement between economic and legal criticisms
of neoliberal orthodoxy. The third chapter illustrates some of the general themes
by looking at two alternative approaches to supporting credit to the poor—the
formal “property rights” approach associated with De Soto and the more informal
microcredit approach associated with Yunus and his Grameen Bank. There have
been many contexts in which the latter approach has been far more successful
than the former in promoting development, and especially the well-being of the
poorest. The chapter explains why that is so, and the circumstances under which
one or the other is more likely to be more effective.
The second part focuses on selected elements in current Chinese economic
policy, exploring the relationship between institutional forms and patterns of
economic life and development within the emerging Chinese market economy.
In thinking about “economic policy” it is conventional to focus on areas that are—
or might be—subject to one or another type of regulation or administrative action.
At the same time, we need to recognize that the legal/institutional framework
includes not just regulations, but the laws that relate to property, contracts, tort
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(liabilities), competition, corporate governance—indeed almost every aspect of a
modern economy. We open this section, therefore, with reflections on debates
within theWest about the nature and desirability of property rights and regulation
and, more broadly, governmental engagement in a market economy.
The contributions that follow assess the role of various regimes of “rights” in
the Chinese economic transition. We start with the role of property rights,
primarily in land, in the economic development of both agricultural and urban
areas during the transition. We then expand the focus to intellectual property
rights as a component in the Chinese innovation system, and to the rights of
corporations (including the internal entitlements of various stakeholders in their
governance) and of labor, particularly in the context of the Hukou system. All
rights regimes entail social compromise and have social consequences. We fore-
ground the significance of social considerations in the Chinese context through
examination of the minimum livelihood guarantee policy and the intergenera-
tional content of social spending. Our objective in this part, taken as a whole, is to
heighten awareness of the interactions and parallels among institutional and legal
arrangements that seem to concern different areas of economic life or express
different overall commitments. Development policy is every bit as complex and
significant in the establishment of property rights as in social spending for health
care—and they are related.
The interactions among seemingly divergent fields of regulation and entitle-
ment make the institutional framework for considering and reconsidering devel-
opment policy particularly important.
In the third part, we focus on two issues that have been central to discussions of
the appropriate form for the Chinese state in light of the nation’s development
challenges: the relationship between central and local authority and the relation-
ship between judicial and other modes of legal interpretation, legislation, and
enforcement.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We are convinced that political, social, and cultural values—including concerns
about social harmony and the harmony between humans and nature—must drive
economic strategy and shape the form of the market economy that China builds
for itself in the coming decades. The appropriate legal question is what regulatory
and institutional forms are appropriate for China’s own evolving economic and
political strategy.
We hope that this volume will be of help to those in China as they strive to
continue their move to a market economy within a harmonious society, to those
in developing countries trying to create an institutional framework consistent with
equitable and sustainable development, and to those within the advanced indus-
trial countries trying to reform their institutional and regulatory systems about
which the global financial crisis has raised such fundamental questions. As those
responsible for making decisions about these institutional arrangements make
their choices, and consider the consequences of those choices for their societies,
we hope that they will consider the available alternatives to the “neoliberal
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orthodoxy,” alternatives that hold out the promise of higher and more sustainable
growth and greater equity.
NOTES
1. After the UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, headed by former US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Hernando de Soto, issued its report “Making
the LawWork for Everyone: Volume I” in June 2008, the UNDP established its Initiative
for Legal Empowerment of the Poor. To view all reports and documents published by
the Commission see <http://http://www.undp.org/LegalEmpowerment/reports/concep-
t2action.html>.
2. We use the terms “Chicago School” or “neoliberal orthodoxy” as shorthand for the
related economic and legal orthodoxies that arose with neoliberalism and continue to
preoccupy much debate about development policy. This legal orthodoxy has not been
reflected in the best “law and economics” work in the legal field that emerged from the
seminal contributions of Coase and his legal followers. That work has often focused
precisely on the complexities and ambiguities that are inherent in any legal system but
which seem strangely absent among those who now prescribe one or another caricatured
“rule of law” best practice as a route to development. For an analysis of the various
vernacular ideas about the “rule of law” that have animated development thinking, see
Santos (2006). Within economics, the Chicago or neoliberal tradition has often been
closely associated with the emphasis on institutions in development, exemplified by the
important work of Douglass C. North (see Davis and North 1971; North 1981 and 1990),
for which he received the Nobel Prize along with Robert William Fogel in 1993. Of
course, North was far from the first to emphasize the importance of institutions. Indeed,
a major battle of ideas in mid-twentieth-century economics was between the old
institutionalists (such as John R. Commons) and analytic neoclassical economics.
Hardly had neoclassical economics won that battle when former disciples of that school
began once again emphasizing the importance of institutions, exemplified by Stiglitz’s
work on sharecropping (1974). There was a heated debate between Stiglitz and the
Chicago School economist Steven N. S. Cheung, where the latter claimed that sharecrop-
ping made no difference to the equilibrium (see Cheung 1969a and 1969b). Income and
output would be exactly the same with or without sharecropping. Stiglitz explained how
incomplete contracts and markets, and asymmetries of information gave rise to the
institution of sharecropping and that Cheung’s conclusions were valid only under
assumptions of perfect information and perfect markets—assumptions in which the
institution itself would not have existed. It is interesting to note that these ideas have had
a very different uptake in legal scholarship.
3. Financial support from the Brooks World Poverty Institute for the first set of meetings
was especially critical. The dialogues were organized by the Initiative for Policy Dialogue
at Columbia University, with financial support from the Hewlett and Ford Foundations
and from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Financial support from Columbia University
and its Committee on Global Thought is also gratefully acknowledged. Logistical
support for meetings in China was provided by the China Development Research
Council Foundation, and financial support for the 2009 meeting of the China Task
Force at Peking University by the Research Center for Property Exchange at Peking
University is also gratefully acknowledged.
4. There is a large literature—mainly from Americans—arguing for the economic super-
iority of the American legal model. While this empirical literature has been widely
debunked, one need only note that correlation is not causation. Moreover, apparently
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paradoxical examples abound. For instance, one of the most successful countries in
Africa—one of the few without extractible natural resources—has been Mauritius,
which lies within the French legal tradition. East Asia has been the most successful
region in the world, with few countries adhering to the Anglo-American tradition.
5. For instance, when land is inequitably distributed, some form of tenancy evolves—
most commonly sharecropping. Sharecropping greatly attenuates work incentives.
Standard (old) theory assumed that lump sum redistributions were possible, but in
fact all redistributions entail distortionary taxes. See, for instance, Stiglitz (1994).
6. See, in particular, Posner’s recent books (2009, 2010) and Greenspan’s mea culpa
before Congress (cited in Stiglitz 2010: 149).
7. Perhaps one of the reasons that the neoliberal Chicago School placed so little emphasis
on these issues is that they focused on a model in which there were so many players in
every market that no one had bargaining power. But even if there are many firms in the
economy and many workers, particular workers bargain with particular firms over
wages and working conditions. Transactions costs (including those associated with
information imperfections) mean that different firms and workers are not perfect
substitutes for each other. At the micro-level, bargaining power matters.
8. See Coase (1937 and 1960).
9. See, for instance, Calabresi and Melamed (1972), reprinted with commentary and a
brief history of the “law and economics” movement within the legal academy in
Kennedy and Fisher (2006: 401–45).
10. For instance, standard exposition highlighted how assignments of property rights
could even resolve problems of externalities. If smokers exerted a negative externality
on nonsmokers, an efficient solution could be obtained by assigning property rights
either to smokers or to nonsmokers. In one case, the smokers would attempt to bribe
the nonsmokers; in the other, the nonsmokers would bribe the smokers. If the sums of
the consumer surpluses enjoyed by the smokers as a result of smoking exceeded the
losses to the nonsmokers, the equilibrium would entail smoking. But implementing
such a scheme required knowledge of the smokers’ consumer surpluses, something that
could not be easily observed. If the smokers had to actually compensate the nonsmo-
kers, each had an incentive to pretend that his own consumer surplus was low, to free
ride on the compensation provided by others. See Farrell (1987).
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